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Persuading a State to Budge It: Benefits,
Consequences, and Obstacles to State Budget
Default Rules
MARGARET NUNNE*
The Illinois legislature’s budget impasse has led to a series of measures
cobbled together to keep the state operational and state employees paid. Late
budgets, impasses, and failed budgets lead to government shutdowns. Government shutdowns mean government services can be put at risk, which, in
turn, can harm the public. In considering the future, as politicians continue
to or refuse to negotiate, default budget rules have been used to some success
in other states by preventing a complete shutdown of the state in the face of
an impasse. However, the use of the rule can cause different problems and
may be impossible to implement in a tense political climate. Ultimately, this
Note explores the benefits, drawbacks, and consequences of default budget
rules, and offers suggestions as to what a default budget rule could look like
in Illinois.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In fiscal year 2016, Illinois achieved the dubious honor as the only state
to operate without a full budget for the fiscal year, relying instead upon a
stopgap budget,1 passed and enacted hours before the expiration of the fiscal
year, and upon court ordered spending2 to muddle through. Illinois faces conditions that have caused a Rudget negotiation RreakdoQnK created Ry ;divided
government, mix in red-hot tax issues, sprinkle with partisan politics, build
on a base of pension liabilities, structural deficits and a dash of Great Recession hangovers, and you have the noxious stews that created the recent budget
standoffs . . . ..3 In a dysfunctional state with a divided government like Illinois, the allure of a default rule in the event of a budget impasse that continues fulfilling state employee paychecks, paying bills, and ensuring government services can be appealing to a worn-out populace.4 A default rule that
continues the status quo would, in theory, seemingly cure the immediate effects of a budget standoff.
However, a provision like a default rule may not cure society’s illsK and
an improperly drafted mandate may even serve to engrain the very problems
causing the need for a rule. The devil is in the details as to what form and
function a default rule may take to avoid the pitfalls in accounting and governance. Another set of problems arise in considering how to pass such a
provision in a divided state like Illinois. Despite the desperate need for default rules in the event of a shutdown in Illinois, with employees dependent
on court orders5 and social services dependent upon the good will of the legislature,6 passing a default rule could be as impossible as passing a budget

1. S.B. 2047, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016).
2. "m. Eed’n of /tate v. /tateK 8G95 B? "(( M5thL 95G833-U.
3. Elaine S. Povich, Rancor Between Governors and Legislatures Causes RecordBreaking Budget Impasses in Illinois and Pennsylvania, ST. LEGISLATURES MAGAZINE 20 (July
27, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/state-legislatures-magazine/rancor-causes-budgetimpasses-illinois-pennsylvania.aspx.
4. E.g., David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns:
Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 254-55 (2015).
5. Am. Fed’n of State, 2015 IL App (5th) 150277-U, ¶ 2.
6. S.B. 2047, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016); see Dave McKinney & Karen Pierog,
Illinois Lawmakers +ass .ills to Unbloc< State’s Budget Impasse, REUTERS (June 30, 2016,
10:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-budget-idUSKCN0ZG16N.
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and would not fix the other imbalances in the budgeting process.7 The impossibility arises from the necessity of a budget provision in Illinois to be an
amendment to the Illinois State Constitution in order to safeguard its future
implementation.8 Even with the passage of a default rule, the existing bandage measures have not created the necessary environment to induce the Illinois General Assembly to pass a budget,9 and may be construed as an argument against default budget rules in Illinois.10 Yet constitutional provisions
and statutes already do exist governing government budgets, procedures, and
contracts in other states. Wisconsin11 and Rhode Island12 are models that may
be followed by states that are looking to head-off the consequences of a
budget impasse. This Note endeavors to examine the benefits and potential
shortcomings of a default budget rule, using Illinois as a foil to discuss not
only the causes and consequences of a budget impasse, which a default rule
would not necessarily fix, but also the impossibility of passing such a default
rule in an environment filled with political tension that is marked by positional politics. Finally, this Note concludes with the recommendations for
qualities that any future default budget rule may need to incorporate to be
accepted in Illinois.
Part II of this Note examines the features of a default budgeting rule and
its basis in contract as an alternative or a supplement to a negotiated agreement. Part III of this Note examines budget rules already in existence, paying
special attention to Wisconsin and Rhode Island and other state proposals of
such default rules. Part IV examines the current state of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois statutes governing the budget procedure, noting the measures
that have been taken up to this point to continue state government operations.

7. See Thomas Walstrum, The Illinois Budget Crisis in Context: A History of Poor
Fiscal Performance, 2016 CHI. FED LETTER NO. 365 (2016), https://chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2016/365 (pdf of article accompanying); see also Richard Dye & David Merriman, First 1ou Stop Digging; +ro>ections of Illinois’ Fiscal Imbalance and +aths to
Remedy It, FISCAL FUTURES PROJECT (Nov. 30, 2016), https://igpa.uillinois.edu/sites/igpa.uillinois.edu/files/reports/First-You-Stop-Digging_FFP_112816_FINAL2.pdf; Kim Geiger,
*auner, 3adigan 2ow Can’t :ven Agree on 7ow to 2egotiate, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2016, 6:45
AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-mike-madigan-illinois-budget-met-1207-20161207-story.html.
8. See ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
9. See Am. Fed’n of State, 2015 IL App (5th) 150277-U; S.B. 2047, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016).
10. See Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, at 246-47; see also COLBEY SULLIVAN, MINN.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, POLICY BRIEF: AUTOMATIC CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS &
GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWNS 8 (Dec. 2011), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/contappr.pdf.
11. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 20.002(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
12. 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-3-19 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
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Part V examines the problems with default rules, their impact on the negotiation process, and their potential to stall progress towards passing a budget.
Part VI moves on to the possible configurations of a default budget rule, specifically considering the provisions for such a rule in Illinois, in order to combat some of the problems laid out in Part V. Part VI concludes the Note.

II.
A.

WHAT ARE DEFAULT RULES

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEFAULT AND IMMUTABLE
RULES

Default rules exist most clearly in contract law, and act as a reserve to
prevent the incomplete contract from becoming ineffectual.13 Specifically,
;TdSefault rules fill the ga(s in incom(lete contracts% they govern unless the
(arties contract around them..14 Alternatively, immutable rules are immune
to negotiated provisions that change or remove them, because ;they govern
even if the (arties attem(t to contract around them..15 Immutable rules are
considered to Re Reneficial QhenK ;society Qants to (rotect M9L (arties Qithin
the contractK or M8L (arties outside the contract..16 The immutable rules can
be considered too paternalisticK as ;TiSmmutaRility is :ustified only if unregI
ulated contracting would be socially deleterious because parties internal or
eOternal to the contract cannot ade'uately (rotect themselves..17 Because immutable rules prevent the freedom of contract, when the circumstances surrounding the use of immutable rules is not justifiable, a default rule is employed to provide protection to the parties both within and outside the contract, but may also be negotiated around in the event the parties want a different term rather than the default rule.18
Default rules have been segregated into two different broad categories,
the first stated conce(tually as default rules ;set at Qhat the (arties Qould
have Qanted . . . -should (rovide all the (arties Qith the type of contract that
they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money to bargain
over all as(ects of their deal.’.19 "lternativelyK (enalty defaults (rovides ;at
least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule
13. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 88.
18. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 89.
19. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 90 (quoting Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985));
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204(d) (2016).
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and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract (rovision they (refer..20
The penalty default rule encourages the parties to continue negotiation over
accepting the default.21 These categories can be supplemented by tailored and
untailored default rules, with tailored default rules attempting to closely approximate what the parties would have contracted for.22 In contrast, untailored defaults seek to provide the parties with a pre-formulated rule that the
majority of contracting parties would prefer to fill in in an incomplete contract.23
B.

APPLYING DEFAULT RULES TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR

These default and immutable rules have been used and supplied mainly
to the private sector as individuals and businesses negotiate and contract with
each other.24 However, there have been some calls to apply immutable rule
contract theory to (uRlic contract negotiationsK Recause even though ;conI
ventional economic wisdom is that mandatory standards are undesirable because they hinder bargaining to efficient outcomes, that logic does not apply
where there are market failures and contracts do not account for costs im(osed on third (arties Qho cannot (rotect themselves..25 These contracts are
generally between the public government party and a private party, and the
author calls for reading in a ;mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the (uRI
lic interest. . . . [A] mandatory rule is justified here because the law must
protect non-parties to the contract who cannot adequately protect themselves..26 These parties that cannot protect themselves are, effectively, the
public.27 The call for a default rule in the public sphere has been extended to
the bargaining and negotiating of the public budget within the public body of
the legislature,28 with a default rule that is enacted each time the legislature

20. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 91.
21. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 91. But see Erick Maskin, On the Rationale
for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 557-58 (2006).
22. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 91.
23. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983); Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 13, at 91.
24. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13.
25. Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2217 (2013).
26. Id. at 2211; see also John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory
of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 829 (2006).
27. Epstein, supra note 25, at 2214-15.
28. See Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, at 182; see also Katharine G. Young, American Exceptionalism and Government Shutdowns: A Comparative Constitutional Reflection on
the 2013 Lapse in Appropriations, 94 B.U. L. REV. 991 (2014).
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fails in its task to pass a budget to prevent harms to the public at large but
may be contracted around by the legislature when it passes a budget.29
This idea arises out of the concept that legislatures face greater political
divisiveness from the rise of political partisanship.30 The control of the large
amounts of money comprising the state budget,31 the relatively short period
of time for its consideration,32 coupled with rules imposing greater vote majorities, also known as supermajorities, on not only imposing or increasing
taxes but on merely passing a state budget,33 raises the concern that those
most vulnerable to a budgetary impasse should have greater protections afforded to them than solely the ability to vote for their own representative each
election cycle.34 Several states currently have increased budget vote requirements, including Nebraska, which requires a two-thirds majority for any
budget passed after March 31,35 and Maine, which requires the budget to be
passed with a two-thirds majority as an emergency act after April 1.36 Despite
the supermajority vote requirements to pass a budget among states, including
Bllinois’s three-fifths majority requirement to pass bills after May 31 to encourage the legislature to pass a budget bill on time,37 a 1995 report from
California analyNing California’s su(erma:ority re'uirement showed that
such procedural measures did not restrain spending.38 Instead, small groups
used the requirement to hold the budget process hostage, and trading votes
became costly as the deadline approached.39 Bt has Reen oRserved that ;TtShe
Rudget is the Rlue(rint for the state government’s (riorities in the coming
29. Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, at 188-192.
30. See generally Louk & Gamage, supra note 4.
31. Luke Martel et al., State Fiscal Health Workgroup: A Guide to Better State Budgeting Practices, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES 22 (Oct. 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/NCSL_A_Guide_to_Better_State_Budgeting_Practices_Oct_2016.pdf M;Total
state budgets range from about $4.5 billion in South Dakota to more than $282 billion in California..L.
32. Id. M;/outh Dakota’s ?egislature has 98 Qeeks to consider its budget, while the
California ?egislature has aRout 8G..L.
33. Erica MacKellar, Supermajority Vote Requirements to Pass the Budget, NAT’L
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/supermajority-vote-requirements-to-pass-the-budget635542510.aspx.
34. Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, at 183-84 M;Bn recent yearsK as (arty (olariNation
and partisan fiscal politics have made it ever more difficult to reach agreement, government
shutdowns have been occurring at both the federal and state levels with increasing frequency.
But few Americans consider government shutdowns to be a functional default option when
negotiations fail.. (footnotes omitted)).
35. MacKellar, supra note 33.
36. Todd Haggerty, Shutdown Showdowns, ST. LEGISLATURES MAG. (Dec. 1, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/shutdown-showdowns.aspx.
37. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 75/2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of the 2016
Reg. Sess.).
38. Martel et al., supra note 31, at 25.
39. Martel et al., supra note 31, at 25.
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year or biennium. To the extent legislators can improve the budgeting processK they also can im(rove efficiencies in their state governments..40
C.

BENEFITS TO DEFAULT RULES

The most obvious direct benefit of a default rule that continues the appropriation of government funds, even without the express consent of the
legislature, is its prevention of the costs of a shutdown and its continuance of
government services.41 0n the state levelK Bllinois’s current Rudget im(asse
has offered a number of examples of the costs of the state budget’s aRsenceK
from colleges and universities,42 to public health,43 and even future debt service.44 However, Illinois is not the only state to have experienced a recent
Rudget im(asse. Bn 8GG3K Michigan’s four-hour shutdown resulted in campers being asked to leave state parks and decreased police presence on highways.45 >eQ Aersey’s (artial shutdoQn in fiscal year 8GG3 had the uni'ue

16.

40.
41.

Martel et al., supra note 31, at 2.
Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, 190-93; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 9-

42. See Ashley A. Smith, Struggling to Cope in Illinois, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 11,
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/07/11/illinois-community-colleges-dealbudget-impasse; Rick Seltzer, ,2ail in the Coffin’ for Chicago State/, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct.
5, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/10/05/chicago-state-struggles-underquestions-enrollment-finance-leadership; Elizabeth Campbell, Illinois Colleges Besieged By
Cuts as Budget Fight Trickles Down, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2016, 2:06 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-26/illinois-colleges-besieged-by-cuts-asbudget-fight-trickles-down; Jodi S. Cohen, State Universities: Illinois Budget Stalemate Causing Damage ,Beyond Repair’, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 20, 2016, 9:15 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-illinois-higher-education-funding-20160119-story.html.
43. See Phil Kadner, Illinois Financial Chaos Hurts Those Most in Need, CHI. TRIB.
(June 30, 2015, 5:49 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/news/ctsta-kadner-state-crisis-st-0701-20150630-story.html; Maggie Thomas, Public Health Without
a Budget: Budget Crisis in Illinois, PUB. HEALTH POST (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.publichealthpost.org/news/public-health-without-budget-budget-crisis-illinois/; Dean Olson,
7ealth Care, 7uman Service +roviders Cope as State’s Unpaid .ills +ile Up, ST. J. REG.,
http://www.sj-r.com/news/20160605/health-care-human-services-providers-cope-as-statesunpaid-bills-pile-up (last updated June 6, 2016, 8:08 PM); Monique Garcia & Kim Geiger,
Illinois (omen 7it ,Disproportionately 7ard’ .y *ecord State .udget Impasse, CHI. TRIB.
(June 17, 2016, 1:30 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinoisbudget-women-met-20160617-story.html.
44. See Rating Action; 3oody’s Downgrades Illinois GOs to Baa2 from Baa1; Related Ratings Also Downgraded, MOODY’S INV’RS SERV. (June 08, 2016),
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Illinois-GOs-to-Baa2-from-Baa1related-ratings--PR_903266220 [hereinafter Rating Action].
45. Late State Budgets, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 27, 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/late-state-budgets.aspx [hereinafter Late State
Budgets].
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distinction of being the cause of a three-day shutdoQn of "tlantic City’s caI
sinos as state casino inspectors were furloughed.46 Similarly, in fiscal year
8GG7K Tennessee’s (artial shutdoQn meant (uRlic university classes RecomI
ing cancelled, state park closures, the non-issuance of driver’s licensesK and
a stoppage of road construction.47 Individually, these events reveal varied
costs of the stoppage of government services and the wide impact that stop(age can have u(on a state’s economy.
The costs of an absentee budget can be categorized into increased expenses, reduced revenues, and a decrease in confidence in the government.48
An increase of expenses arises from the costs associated with extending the
legislative session or adding days to the legislative calendar, local governments being unable to budget effectively, and the costs from associated lawsuits.49 Without a budget, state employees may or may not be paid, which
translates into less state economic activity and tax revenue.50 A one-day shutdown in Pennsylvania resulted in 24,000 employees being furloughed and
approximately $3.5 million in lost employee wages.51 Further, the New Jersey casino shutdown in fiscal year 2007 led to a loss of $3.9 million in gambling tax revenue for just three days of closure.52 The long-term consequences of a budget impasse and government shutdown include a possible
doQngrade in the state’s credit rating,53 which affects interest rates and debt
service. Former New York Comptroller H. Carl McCall argues that late budgets Qere a contriRuting factor to the state’s loQ credit ratingK and a re(ort
from the >eQ Vork Com(troller’s 0ffice noted ;a credit u(grade of one rating Qould have saved the state an estimated +952 million..54 Also in the long
term, in a protracted period without a budget, a state risks reduction in constituent confidence in the stability and efficacy of the government.55 Illinois
has already seen its credit rating lowered,56 and a lack of confidence in government may theoretically combine with other dissatisfactions, like taxes and
weather, to create a desire to leave the state, and thereby possibly reduce the
tax base.57 Continuing the flow of state money can theoretically help prevent

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Late State Budgets, supra note 45.
51. Late State Budgets, supra note 45.
52. Late State Budgets, supra note 45.
53. Late State Budgets, supra note 45; see also Rating Action, supra note 44.
54. Haggerty, supra note 36.
55. Haggerty, supra note 36.
56. Rating Action, supra note 44.
57. Haggerty, supra note 36; see Poll: Illinois Voters Divided Over Remaining in the
State, NEWS S. ILL. U. (Oct. 10, 2016), http://news.siu.edu/2016/10/101016par16116.html
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some of these consequences by giving legislators and constituents a fallback
in the event of a failed negotiation.

III.

EXAMPLES OF STATE DEFAULT BUDGET RULES

In order to understand the default budget rules that already exist in Wisconsin and Rhode Island, they must be considered in context of the budgeting
procedure as a whole.
A.

WISCONSIN

In Wisconsin, the budget process is a system similar to the Illinois
budget process in that it includes both the Governor and the Legislature.58
However, there are key differences that, in combination with its default
budget rule, are significant to create a process that is transparent and offers a
safety net to everyday citizens.
Under Article VIII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin ConstitutionK ;>o
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation Ry laQ..59 The Wisconsin budget procedure is a biennial process,60
which has persisted even though the Legislature meets on an annual basis.61
The process starts with Wisconsin agencies submitting budget proposals to
the State Budget Office in the executive Department of Administration no
later than September 15 of even-numbered years.62 By November 20 of evennumbered years, the Department of Administration delivers a compilation of
each agency’s total Riennial Rudget re'uest to the Dovernor or Dovernorelect and every member of the legislature.63 After the Department of Administration delivers the budget requests, the non-partisan Legislative Fiscal Bureau issues a summary of the major points of the agency budget requests to
the members of the legislature in December of the even-numbered years, and
M;-Policy-makers argue over Qhether (eo(le are leaving or notK’ Ve(sen said. -The most trouI
Rling finding in this (oll is that so many younger (eo(le are thinking aRout it. That’s the
state’s future.’.L.
58. See Wisconsin Budget Toolkit, WIS. BUDGET PROJECT, http://www.wisconsinbudgetproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Budget-toolkit.pdf (last updated Apr. 2017)
[hereinafter Wisconsin Budget Toolkit].
59. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
60. BOB LANG & SANDY SWAIN, STATE BUDGET PROCESS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 73,
WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU 15 (Jan. 2017), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/informational_papers/january_2017/0073_state_budget_process_informational_paper_73.pdf.
61. Id.
62. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.42 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6); LANG & SWAIN,
supra note 60, at 3.
63. WIS. STAT. ANN § 16.43 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6); LANG & SWAIN,
supra note 60, at 4.
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a revenue estimate disseminated to legislators in January of the odd-numbered years.64
Meanwhile, the State Budget Office in the Department of Administration provides information to the Governor, who incorporates it into a budget
address and a proposed budget bill in February of the odd-numbered years.65
The Dovernor’s Rudget Rill is introduced Qithout changes to a Joint Committee on Finance, which is comprised of members from both houses66 and holds
(uRlic hearings on the Dovernor’s (ro(osed RudgetK Qhich included Roth
agency experts and members of the general public.67 After the public hearings, the Joint Committee on Finance holds executive sessions that result in
the drafting of a budget bill that generally contains changes from the Governor’s (ro(osed Rudget Rill.68
The Aoint Committee on Einance’s Rill is returned to the house of the
Legislature that it was introduced into, and that house schedules briefings
with the non-partisan Legislative Fiscal Bureau staff to brief the legislators,
which usually leads to the political parties caucusing on the bill.69 If a member of the Legislature wishes to amend the bill at this stage, the member must
have an amendment drafted, or alternatively, the majority caucus drafts a
package of amendments that are considered.70 If the houses pass different
versions of the budget bill, they can meet in a conference committee, or alternatively to ;successively (assK RetQeen the housesK narroQing amendI
ments dealing with only the points of difference between the respective budgets as initially recommended Ry the tQo houses..71 When the budget bill is
agreed upon, it is sent to the Governor, who signs, vetoes, or partially vetoes
the bill.72
However, in the event that a budget is not passed and signed, Section
20.002(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides:
(1) Effective period of appropriations. Unless
otherwise provided appropriations shall become effective on July 1 of the fiscal year shown in the
schedule under s. 20.005 and shall be expendable
64. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 4.
65. WIS. STAT. ANN § 16.47 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6); LANG & SWAIN,
supra note 60, at 6.
66. WIS. STAT. ANN § 13.093(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6); LANG &
SWAIN, supra note 60, at 6.
67. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 6-7; see also Wisconsin Budget Toolkit, supra
note 58.
68. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 8.
69. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 10.
70. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 11.
71. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 12.
72. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 13.
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until the following June 30. If the legislature does
not amend or eliminate any existing appropriation
on or before July 1 of the odd-numbered years, such
existing appropriations provided for the previous
fiscal year shall be in effect in the new fiscal year
and all subsequent fiscal years until amended or
eliminated by the legislature. 73
This provision allows the state agencies to continue to operate in the absence
of a budget, although any appropriations made subsequently will be offset by
the expenses already incurred.74 Enacted in 1953,75 the provision has led to a
continuing of government functions despite a total of eleven budgets being
passed after July 1 since 1977.76 The latest date a new budget was enacted in
Wisconsin was December 20, 1995.77 The greatest consequence of a late
budget is that new programs created after the prior biennial budget was enacted, and if there were no amendments made by the Governor or legislature
mid-course to accommodate those programs,78 then those programs will not
be funded until the new biennial budget is passed.79 Past these consequences,
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau Director !oR ?ang says ;>o one in our
state knoQs the difference RetQeen Aune 7G and Auly 9..80
However, examining the budget process as a whole provides a clearer
picture as to why a default budget rule is so successful in Wisconsin, particularly when considering the biennium budget process and the concentrated
power in the Joint Committee of Finance that heads off differences between
the houses of the legislature. Although there have been no clear determinations as to the superiority of either the biennial or annual budget systems, the
biennial budget process may give the executive branch reduced costs in salary and staff time as the longer period of time between budgeting periods
73. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 20.002(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
74. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 20.
75. 1953 Wis. Sess. Laws 226.
76. Molly Beck, July 1: What Happens If Lawmakers Miss Their Budget Deadline?,
WIS. ST. J. (June 29, 2015), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/julywhat-happens-if-lawmakers-miss-their-budget-deadline/article_b7888f6e-583d-5f74-a0e5676f1bd268f6.html.
77. Id.
78. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 20-21 M;The Rudget may Re modified Ry: M9L
separate legislation authorizing an additional appropriation or eliminating or modifying an
existing appropriation; (2) a budget adjustment bill (generally in the second annual session of
the Legislature) to make changes to the adopted biennial budget; and (3) the authorization of
limited emergency changes to existing appropriations at the request of state agencies with the
ap(roval of the Aoint Committee on Einance..L.
79. Beck, supra note 76.
80. Beck, supra note 76.
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allow staff to examine both the budget that has been implemented and prepare more extensively for the following biennium.81 A common complaint
about biennial budgeting is their time-consuming nature and impreciseness
in the face of state revenues dependent on sales and personal income taxes.82
CoQeverK Wisconsin’s Rudgeting (rocess does provide for course corrections
in the second year of budgeting, correcting the two-year budget previously
passed.83 Wisconsin’s default Rudget rule is thus im(lemented only if a tQoyear process of developing a budget fails to create a consensus among all
parties as to an agreeable budget bill, and serves only to maintain the status
quo as a means of giving the legislature more time to decide which changes
Qill Re made to the (revious Riennium’s Rudget to Re a((lied to the current
fiscal biennium.84
In considering the power structure of the budget process, the bill passed
by the Joint Committee is a bicameral feat, subject to public and administrative testimony, and amendments to the bill are considered separately from
the bill itself.85 Composed of sixteen members, eight senators, and eight representatives, the members are appointed by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate, and the Committee’s revieQ of the ;Dovernor’s recommended budget is<because of both the complexity of the document and
its significance on state government operations<the most extensive and involved revieQ given any Rill in a legislative session..86 Indeed, the Joint
Committee on Finance occupies a prominent place in the Wisconsin legislature, making the budget process streamlined as it deals with the more than
one hundred agency reports filed by state agencies each biennium.87 The
Committee also is res(onsiRle for ;a myriad of other duties and res(onsiRilI
ities to the Committee relating to the approval of executive branch agency
actions, authority to make appropriations and position adjustments to numerous state agency appropriations, and the authority to approve scores of policies and actions Ry state agencies..88 To help aid the Committee, an entire
non-partisan Legislative Fiscal Bureau is devoted to the service of the Committee.89 The power of the Joint Committee, its bicameral nature, and the
non-partisan staffing can point to the intended objective of the committee, to
81. Ron Snell, State Experiences with Annual and Biennial Budgeting, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-experiences-with-annual-and-biennial-budgeti.aspx.
82. Id.
83. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 20-22.
84. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 20.002(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
85. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 11.
86. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 6.
87. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 6.
88. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 22.
89. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 22.
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review and recommend a budget bill that can pass with or without amendment.90 ThereforeK at any (oint in timeK siOteen memRers of Wisconsin’s legI
islature are responsible for agreeing on a passable version of the budget for
Wisconsin.
The history of the Joint Committee points to its efficacy among the other
memRers of the legislature as in 9156K right after Wisconsin’s default rule
was passed, former Wisconsin State Budget Director E.C. Giessel pointed
out that at the time the Aoint Committee’s version of the Rudget Qas usually
passed without amendment as ;TaSll amendments from the floor of the senate
or the assembly to the budget bill normally are killed on the floor. Consequently, in most instances, the budget drafted in the Joint Finance Committee
is passed by the 2 houses of the legislature without change and referred to the
Governor..91 That the default rule was enacted at a time when it was not necessarily needed can make the default rule be considered an accessory feature
to the power of the Joint Committee on Finance, as the entire system is devised in a manner to encourage the passage of a budget bill.92 The default
rule’s long history, the possible effects of the biennial budgeting process,
combined with the standing of the Joint Committee, with its features of encouraging communication between both houses of the legislators and creating a stand alone budget bill, are what make a default budget rule successful
in Wisconsin.
B.

RHODE ISLAND

Rhode Island has also enacted statute that provides for the continuation
of the state funding in the event of a failure to pass a state budget, though the
provisions are slightly different in comparison to Wisconsin. Putting the statute into context, Article IX Section 15 of the Constitution of the State of
Rhode Bsland and Providence Plantations (rovides that ;TtShe governor shall
prepare and present to the general assembly an annual, consolidated operating and ca(ital im(rovement state Rudget..93 Rhode Bsland’s legislature must
pass a budget by a supermajority of two-thirds in order for the budget to become effective.94 Rhode Bsland’s statutes offer a greater explanation of Rhode
Bsland’s Rudget (rocessK as the legislature annually a((ro(riates money for

90.
91.

LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 11.
E.C. Geissel, The Plan and Development of (isconsin’s .udget, in WIS.
BLUEBOOK 79, 83 (Wis. 1954).
92. See 1953 Wis. Sess. Laws 226.
93. R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 15.
94. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
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the state budget95 and provides that by the third Thursday in January for sitting governors and by the first Thursday of February for newly inaugurated
governors, the governor submits to the general assembly a budget that contains ;a com(lete (lan of estimated revenues and (ro(osed eO(endituresK
with a personnel supplement detailing the number and titles of positions of
each agency and the estimates of personnel costs for the next fiscal year . . .
..96
After the governor submits a budget to the general assembly, it is sent
to the House Finance Committee97 in the House of Representatives,98 which
considers the bill in a number of subcommittee hearings that report their recommendations back to the full committee.99 The Senate Finance Committee
also considers the governor’s Rudget RillK simultaneously or after the Rill has
passed the House of Representatives.100 Before final actions by the General
Assembly, the Governor can offer supplements to the budget as amendments
to the appropriation bill or bills.101 After passage by each house of the General Assembly, the Governor has the option to sign the bill into law, veto the
bill, or allow the bill to become law without his signature after six days of no
action.102 The Deneral "ssemRly can overturn the Dovernor’s veto Qith a
three-fifths vote in both houses.103
In the event that a budget is not passed, Rhode Island has enacted a statutory provision to prevent government shutdown, providing:
In an emergency caused by a failure of the general
assembly to pass the annual appropriation bill, the
same amounts appropriated in the previous fiscal
year shall be available for each department and di-

95. 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-3-2 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
96. 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-3-7(a) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
97. R.I. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2017 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: APPENDIX G, at G-6,
http://www.omb.ri.gov/documents/Prior%20Year%20Budgets/Operating%20Budget%202017/ExecutiveSummary/14_Appendix%20G%20The%20Budget%20Process.pdf.
98. 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-3-9 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
99. R.I. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 97, at G-5.
100. 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-3-10 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.); see also R.I. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 97, at G-5.
101. 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-3-12 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
102. R.I. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 97.
103. R.I. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 97.
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vision thereof, subject to monthly or quarterly allotments, in accordance with seasonal requirements, as
determined by the budget officer; provided, that expenditures for payment of bonded indebtedness of
the state and interest thereon shall be in such
amounts as may be required, regardless of whether
or not an annual appropriation bill is passed by the
general assembly.104
The provision was enacted as part of a package in the Administrative Code
"ct in 9175K as the Rhode Bsland ?egislature Qas Qorking to ;organiNe the
/tate’s (oQer structure into departments and assign certain functional tasks
and res(onsiRilities to those de(artments..105 Des(ite the (rovision’s long
history, it has been rarely invoked, since the most recent impasses occurred
in 1992 and 1993, with each lasting about two weeks,106 and a late budget in
Fiscal Year 2004.107 This lack of use of the default budget rule may be the
result of the annual budgeting process that takes place in Rhode Island,108 the
slightly smaller General Assembly,109 but most likely is correlative with the
fact that the Rhode Island General Assembly has been primarily and consistently controlled by the Democratic Party since 1960.110 This wide margin
meets Rhode Bsland’s su(erma:ority tQo-thirds voting requirement for passing the state budget,111 making impasses unlikely because there is no opposition.
C.

OTHER STATES

There are multiple examples of punitive measures if the legislature fails
to pass the budget. In Washington state, a legislator could be found guilty of
a misdemeanor if the legislature does not pass a budget thirty days before the

104. 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-3-19 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
105. Rhode Island Council 94 v. Carcieri, C.A. No. P.C. 08=5073 (R.I. Super. 2008),
https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/DecisionsOrders/carcieri-final.pdf.
106. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 8.
107. Late State Budgets, supra note 45.
108. Snell, supra note 81.
109. R.I. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited
Mar. 21, 2017).
110. Philip Bump, 7ow 1our State’s +olitics 7ave Shifted -ver the 1ears, In %=
Charts, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/09/11/49-charts-that-tell-the-partisan-history-of-state-legislatures/?utm_term=.cb4b98fa89a6.
111. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 11; MacKellar, supra note 33.
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new fiscal biennium112 if not for an opinion from the Washington Attorney
General.113 New York and California legislators can suffer withholding of
their salaries until the passage of the state budget. In New York, the law provides:
If legislative passage of the budget as defined in
subdivision three of this section has not occurred
prior to the first day of any fiscal year, the net
amount of any such bi-weekly salary installment
payments to be paid on or after such day shall be
withheld and not paid until such legislative passage
of the budget has occurred whereupon bi-weekly
salary installment payments shall resume and an
amount equal to the accrued, withheld and unpaid
installments shall be promptly paid to each member.114
This statutory (rovision has Reen u(held Ry >eQ Vork state’s highest courtK
the Court of "((eals of >eQ VorkK Qhich found that the statute didn’t violate
the se(aration of (oQers Rut instead Qas ;the ado(tion of a regimen and inI
centive predicated upon one !ranch’s oQn resonance to a more efficacious
discharge of its allocated and collective constitutional duties . . . ..115 The
legislature was then regulating itself by passing such language.
Similarly, California has a provision in its Constitution that permits the
withholding of a legislator’s pay if a budget is not passed on time.116 The
provision holds that,
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or
of this Constitution, . . . in any year in which the
budget bill is not passed by the Legislature by midnight on June 15, there shall be no appropriation
from the current budget or future budget to pay any
salary or reimbursement for travel or living expenses for Members of the Legislature during any

112. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.88.080 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. & Special Sess. & Laws 2017, chs. 1 to 4 of the Washington legislature); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
43.88.270 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. & Special Sess. & Laws 2017, Chs. 1 to 4 of
the Wash. Leg.).
113. Legislature-Appropriations-Crimes-Failure of Legislature to Comply with RCW
67.22.G2GK 0(. "tt’y Den., AGLO No. 21 (1979).
114. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 5 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, Ch. 1-23).
115. Cohen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 850, 857 (N.Y. 1999).
116. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
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regular or special session for the period from midnight on June 15 until the day that the budget bill is
presented to the Governor. No salary or reimbursement for travel or living expenses forfeited pursuant
to this subdivision shall be paid retroactively.117
The Constitutional provision was enacted as part of a ballot initiative in 2010
and raised an issue in 2011 when the State Controller withheld pay when the
legislature passed a budget that was $2 billion out of balance due to unrealized and unimplemented taxes.118 As part of the interpretation of the constitutional provision, the Third District California Court of Appeal held that the
State Controller had no basis to audit the passed budget that depended on yet
to be realized tax revenue and had no authority to withhold legislator pay on
that basis.119
Yet other states have considered continuing appropriation procedures120
as divisiveness, time constraints, and the amount of money involved in the
budgeting process has made the prospect of a legislature passing a state
budget a daunting concept.121 Minnesota has considered a budget default rule
at least fifteen times from 2005 onward, with bills drafted by both political
parties.122 "ll the Rills Qere similar to Wisconsin’s laQ or Qere a more inI
volved process, and all proposed to continue appropriations at the current rate
in the event of a budget impasse, but none of the bills advanced into law.123
There have also been calls for a default budget rule in Connecticut as the state
deals with a complicated web of executive orders, judicial rulings, and current statutory provisions that a default budget rule could potentially streamline.124

117. Id.
118. Jim Christie, No Budget, No Pay is Word to California Lawmakers, REUTERS
(June 21, 2011, 5:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-economy-california-budget-payidUSTRE75K6RI20110621.
119. Steinberg v. Chiang, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249, 255-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
120. See Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, at 241.
121. Martel et al., supra note 31, at 27.
122. SULLIVAN, supra note 10.
123. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 9.
124. Shelley Geballe, When the State Budget is Late: Establishing Clearer Guidelines
for Connecticut, CONN. VOICES FOR CHILD. 2 (Oct. 2009), http://www.ctvoices.org/sites/defaultHfilesHRudG1stateRudgetlate.(df M;These changes Qould reduce the confusion and uncerI
tainty in the operation and delivery of state- funded services that result from current law and
practice, assure greater predictability for those reliant on state funding, and assure a closer
adherence to the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers between the General AssemRly and the Dovernor than currently eOists in the aRsence of such a statute..L.
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ILLINOIS

Illinois has operated without a state budget for two years as the Democrat controlled General Assembly remains at odds with the Republican Governor.125 The stopgap measures that have been implemented since the start of
the budget impasse have served to act as an unofficial default budget provision, and serve as guides to what a default budget provision may look like in
the future.
A.

THE ILLINOIS BUDGETING PROCESS

Illinois has had four Constitutions, enacted respectively in 1818, 1848,
1870, and 1970, with each attempting to create a perfect cornerstone for the
state while simultaneously adjusting provisions for policy concerns of the
day and the powers of those in office.126 At the 1969 Constitutional ConventionK the state’s Rudget im(lementation (rocedures Qere not considered to Re
a divisive issue.127
As for budget creation and implementation, Article VIII Section Two of
the Illinois Constitution requires the Governor to prepare and submit to the
legislature a budget every year for the state.128 The proposed budget must
include the estimated balance of funds available for appropriation at the beginning of the fiscal year, and also the expected receipts and planned expenditures for the year, requiring the proposed expenditures do not exceed the
estimated funds available for the fiscal year.129 The next step under article
VIII section 2 of the Constitution is that the General Assembly actually make
appropriations for all expenditures of the public funds by the state, and that
those appropriations for a fiscal year would not exceed funds estimated by
the General Assembly for the fiscal year.130 In this manner, it was considered
that the state of Illinois would have an annual balanced budget under the 1970
Constitution.131 According to historians, while the Finance Article of the proposed constitution was revolutionary, there was no real opposition at the convention.132 Instead, the convention was more focused upon taxation and debt,
as the delegates dealt with whether or not to eliminate the personal property
125. Amanda Vinicky, ,8rand .argain’ on .udget 7its 8rand Thud, CHI. TONIGHT
(Mar. 1, 2017, 8:47 PM), http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2017/03/01/grand-bargain-budgethits-grand-thud.
126. See generally ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION (Oxford Univ.
Press ed. 2011).
127. Id. at 34.
128. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a).
129. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a).
130. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
131. LOUSIN, supra note 126, at 34.
132. LOUSIN, supra note 126, at 34.
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tax as part of state revenues.133 Thus the actual constitutional provisions of
the State budgeting process are relatively straight forward, and have been
subsequently supplemented by statute as to times and provisions included in
the budget the governor submits to the legislature.134 Under statute the Governor must include provisions on whether there will be budget surpluses or
deficits each year.135 Despite the numerous provisions about what must be
presented to the Legislature, there is no rule dealing with the absence of a
budget.
Article VIII section 2 of the Illinois Constitution has been interpreted
by the First District Appellate Court of Illinois to preempt the governor and
other state officials from refusing to spend funds appropriated by the General
Assembly.136 CoQeverK the Eirst District’s decision Qas overturned Ry the
Illinois Supreme Court on mootness grounds on appeal which makes the
question of impoundment yet to be determined.137
B.

COURT ORDERS AND STOP GAP BUDGETS

In the absence of a continuing appropriation rule or any other default
budget procedures, Illinois has implemented several measures that could be
argued to be doing the job of a default budget rule. Illinois has made do with
a continuing appropriation court order138 and a stop-gap budget139 to keep the
state running, becoming essentially a tailored non-punitive default budget
rule.140 In 2015, to ensure that individuals employed by the state would be
paid despite the absence of a budget, several state employee unions filed a
lawsuit against the State of Illinois141 and then-Comptroller Leslie GeisslerMunger seeking warrants to compel the Comptroller to issue Union members
paychecks.142 The Comptroller took the position that all state employees
should be paid, and that she was unable to issue paychecks without a court

133. LOUSIN, supra note 126, at 34.
134. See ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/50 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 99-983 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
135. 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/50-10 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
136. W. Side Org. Health Servs. Corp. v. Thompson, 391 N.E.2d 392 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979), rev’d on other grounds, 404 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1980).
137. See W. Side Org. Health Servs. Corp. v. Thompson, 404 N.E.2d 208, 210-11(Ill.
1980).
138. "m. Eed’n of /tate v. State, 2015 IL App (5th) 150277-U.
139. S.B. 2047, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016).
140. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13.
141. Am. Fed’n of State, 2015 IL App (5th) 150277-U, ¶ 4. But cf. /tate v. "m. Eed’n
of State, 2016 IL 118422, 51 N.E.3d 738.
142. Am. Fed’n of State, 2015 IL App (5th) 150277-U, ¶¶ 2-4.
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order compelling her office to issue those paychecks.143 The trial court entered a temporary restraining order that directed the Comptroller to continue
to pay State employees at the regular amount of pay.144
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan appealed the temporary restraining order, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, that the trial
court abused its discretion as a Cook County court entered a conflicting order, the requirements of a temporary restraining order were not met, and that
the court committed reversible error by allowing the Comptroller to be represented by lawyers other than the Illinois Attorney General.145 The Comptroller filed an emergency motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Attorney General and the Comptroller had differing views on the temporary
restraining order, and the Attorney General had no authority to bring the matter on behalf of the Comptroller. 146 The Fifth District Appellate Court held
that the "ttorney Deneral had the authority to (ursue the a((eal as the /tate’s
chief legal officerK dismissing the Com(troller’s motion.147 The Court also
noted that ;TtShere is -no clear-cut definitive ansQer’ to the issue of the proper
procedure to follow when a public official disagrees with the attorney whose
statutory duty it is to re(resent the official.148 and that courts ;have a((roved
the a((ointment of inde(endent counsel as a solution to this (roRlem..149
Dealing with the remaining claims, the Fifth District went on to hold
that the trial court had jurisdiction and that it was appropriate for the St. Clair
County trial court to rule on the matter despite a conflicting Cook County
ruling.150 Further, the Fifth District found that /tate em(loyees (ossess ;a
protectable right, will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, and
have no ade'uate remedy at laQ.151 as State employees cannot be expected
to bring multiple lawsuits to protect their rights as the budget crisis drags
on.152 The Court noted that the Attorney General had not argued that the State
did not have the funds to pay State employees, but rather that the State would
be harmed by paying employee salaries before an appropriation bill had
passed.153 The Fifth District disagreedK saying that to adhere to the /tate’s
143. Id. at ¶ 2.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Am. Fed’n of State, 2015 IL App (5th) 150277-U, ¶ 15.
148. Id. at $ 73 M'uoting /uRurRan Cook Cty. Reg’l 0ffice of Fduc. v. Cook Cty. !d.K
667 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)).
149. Id. at ¶ 37 (citing first People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180 (Ill.
9116L% then citing /uRurRan Cook Cty. Reg’l 0ffice of Fduc. v. Cook Cty. !d.K 443 >.F.8d
1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
150. Id. at ¶ 19-33.
151. Id. at ¶ 21.
152. Am. Fed’n of State, 2015 IL App (5th) 150277-U, ¶ 21.
153. Id. at ¶ 35.
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(osition and Qait for an a((ro(riations Rill Qould harm /tate em(loyees’
families and ;Qould likely im(ose significant Rurdens on the /tate as Qell. .
. . Further, if the budget impasse continues indefinitely and the Comptroller
is not allowed to issue paychecks, the State may become unable to provide
crucial governmental services..154 The Fifth District held that there was no
abuse in discretion in entering the temporary restraining order, but since it is
an emergency measure of limited duration, and the temporary restraining order at issue had no expiration date, and remanded the matter to the trial court
with instructions to set a date for a hearing on a preliminary injunction.155
Later, the temporary restraining order was converted to a preliminary injunction on August 13, 2015.156
It should be noted that Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a Petition
to Intervene and a Motion to Present Additional Authority and to Dissolve
Preliminary Injunction, asking that the injunction be terminated as of February 28, 2017.157 The "ttorney Deneral argues in the motion that the Court’s
order ;has removed any im(erative for the FOecutive and ?egislative
branches to fulfill their basic constitutional obligations and resolve their
Rudget im(asse..158 Instead, the Attorney General says that both branches
depended on the court order to continue operating, as Public Act 99-0524,
also known as the stopgap budget, did not appropriate any money for state
employee salaries.159 As explanation for moving forward with this motion
after almost two years, the Attorney General points to the Illinois Supreme
Court’s ruling in State v. Am. Fed’n of State, 2016 IL 118422, which held
that state employee wages are ;always contingent on legislative funding.160
and that the wage increase at issue negotiated under the collective bargaining
agreement was subject to an appropriations bill from the General Assembly.161 Although the majority stated that its decision applied only to the contract Refore the court and did not create uncertainty as to the /tate’s oRligaI
tions under its contracts,162 the Attorney General uses the decision as the first
154. Id. at ¶ 36.
155. Id. at ¶ 39.
156. Motion to Present Additional Authority & to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction at
4K "m. Eed’n of /tate v. RaunerK >o. 95 CC 635 MBll. Cir. Ct. 2015),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_n6YwzWTgysVWRiOVotZ3I4TW8/view.
157. AG Lisa Madigan Files Motion to Stop Paying State Employees Without Budget,
ABC 7 NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://abc7chicago.com/news/ag-lisa-madigan-files-motion-tostop-paying-state-employees-without-budget/1723203/.
158. Motion to Present Additional Authority & to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction at
8K "m. Eed’n of /tate v. RaunerK >o. 95 CC 635 MBll. Cir. Ct. 2015),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_n6YwzWTgysVWRiOVotZ3I4TW8/view.
159. Id.
160. State v. /tate v. "m. Eed’n of State, 2016 IL 118422, ¶ 52, 51 N.E.3d 738, 749.
161. Id. at ¶ 56.
162. Id. at ¶ 54.
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argument in her Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction.163 However,
St. Clair County Circuit Court Judge Robert LeChien rejected Attorney General Madigan’s Motion to Rescind the 0rder in EeRruary 8G93K and state emI
ployees continue to be paid.164
The other piece of directed funding that kept the state limping through
2016 is the stopgap budget165 that permitted public schools to open in the fall,
continued road construction projects, and paid down debts to social service
agencies.166 The Rill Qas criticiNed as draining Bllinois’s rainy day fundK167
and as being out of balance with the expected revenues.168 Unanimously
passed in the Senate,169 and almost unanimously passed in the House of Representatives,170 the stopgap budget expired on December 31, 2016, and once
again Illinois was left without a budget.171 It should be noted that there are
other continuing appropriations under Illinois statute that are not subject to
appropriations by the state budget, like pension payments,172 bonds and
debt,173 guarantees on loans to farmers, agribusinesses, and veteran-owned

163. Motion to Present Additional Authority & to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 156, at 6.
164. Sue Britt, Update-1 Judge Orders Illinois to Continue to Pay State Workers,
REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2017, 5:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/illinois-budgetidUSL1N1G1251.
165. S.B. 2047, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016).
166. Monique Garcia et al., Rauner Signs Stopgap Budget, School Funding Bill 6 But
Relief From Stalemate Proves Temporary, CHI. TRIB. (June 30, 2016, 8:54 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-budget-impasse-madiganrauner-met-0701-20160630-story.html.
167. Sara Burnett, Illinois Drains State’s Savings Account Due to Budget Crisis, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 14, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/illinois/illinoisdrains-state-s-savings-account-due-to-budget-crisis/article_fdbe456b-fc18-5c24-81d7d95e38448a0a.html.
168. Garcia et al., supra note 166.
169. S.B. 2047, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016).
170. Id.
171. Doug Finke, Illinois Enters 2017 With No State Budget, ST. J. REG.,
http://www.sj-r.com/news/20161231/illinois-enters-2017-with-no-state-budget (last updated
Dec. 31, 2016, 7:49 PM).
172. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/1 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of the 2016
Reg. Sess.).
173. 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 440/8 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of the 2016
Reg. Sess.); 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 355/13 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.).
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small businesses174 and revolving loan programs for ambulances,175 fire stations,176 and fire trucks.177 Together with the court order, these measures have
acted as default appropriations that have kept the state operational.
Punitive measures against the members of the legislature have been limited to the late issuance of memRers’ (aychecks Ry Eormer Com(troller
Leslie Geissler-Munger.178 This means that Illinois legislators have not received payment for salary since June of 2016,179 despite Article IV Section
11 of the Illinois Constitution providing that legislators ;shall receive a salary
and allowances as provided by law, but changes in the salary of a member
shall not take effect during the term for Qhich he has Reen elected..180 Further, in 2014, the majority leaders ensured that legislator and judges pay
would be a continuing appropriation under Public Act 98-0682,181 meaning
legislator salaries would be paid with or without the passage of a state budget.
These measures taken together provide that statutorily, legislators must be
paid whether the General Assembly passes a budget or not.
The Illinois Supreme Court has weighed in in the past on attempted
changes to state employee salaries in Jorgensen v. Blagojevich.182 The issue
in Jorgensen involved a class action by Illinois judges against Governor
Blagojevich to determine if the Governor and General Assembly violated the
Illinois Constitution by not implementing cost of living adjustments (COLAs) to judicial salaries.183 The Supreme Court invoked the separation of
174. 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 355/13 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3501/830-35 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99983 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3501/830-45 (West, Westlaw through
P.A. 99-983 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3501/835-20 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 99-983 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
175. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3501/825-85 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of
the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
176. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3501/825-81 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of
the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
177. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3501/825-80 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of
the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
178. Kim Geiger & Monique Garcia, Comptroller Says Illinois Lawmakers Will Have
to Get in a Long Line to Get Paid, CHI. TRIB. (April 18, 2016, 6:58 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-comptroller-lawmaker-paychecks-met-041820160417-story.html.
179. Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandamus at 2, People ex rel.
Welch v. Munger, No. 2016-CH-15642 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.scribd.com/document/333039895/Illinois-legislators-pay-lawsuit#from_embed;
see also Stefano Esposito & Tina Sfondeles, Democratic Legislators Sue State Over Not Getting Paid, CHI. SUN TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016, 7:32 PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/group-of-illinois-legislators-sue-state-over-not-getting-paid/.
180. ILL. CONST. art IV, § 11.
181. 2014 Ill. Laws 1591.
182. See Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2004).
183. Id. at 654.
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powers doctrine of the Illinois Constitution,184 as the court stated ;[f]or
checks and balances to work properly in protecting individual liberty, each
of the three branches of government must be kept free from the control or
coercive influence of the other Rranches..185 The court then went on to find
that even in an emergencyK reducing :udicial salaries Qas disalloQed as ;any
departure from the law is impermissible unless justification for that departure
is found within the law itself. FOigent circumstances are not enough. ->either
the legislature nor any executive or judicial officer may disregard the provisions of the constitution even in case of a great emergency.’.186
Former Comptroller, current Deputy Governor, Leslie Geissler-Munger
acknowledged that her plan to move legislator paychecks to the bottom of
the hea( of un(aid Rills in the state Qas ;(ocketRook (olitical (ressure.. 187
Yet this method may have been somewhat effective in getting the legislature’s attentionK as it (rom(ted six State Representatives to file a Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandamus asking the court to find the
Comptroller has a nondiscretionary duty to pay monthly salaries to the Illinois General Assembly.188

V.

PROBLEMS WITH DEFAULT RULES

Default rules present their own set of challenges, as by their very nature
they can have implications on negotiation, can cause a continuation of the
issues that were the catalyst for their necessity, and can be argued to supplant
natural legislative authority in the distribution of funds.
A.

DEFAULT RULES AND NEGOTIATION

Another conceptualization of a default rule in government is as a Best
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), as formulated by Roger
Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project.189 Fisher and Ury
note that Qhen (arties negotiate under the (remise of a ;Rottom lineK. the
bottom line limits the benefits of learned information during negotiation, as
;by definition, a bottom line is a position that is not to be changed. To that
extent you have shut your ears, deciding in advance that nothing the other
184. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
185. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d at 660.
186. Id. at 663 (quoting People ex rel. Lyle v. City of Chicago, 195 N.E. 451, 453 (Ill.
1935)).
187. Geiger & Garcia, supra note 178.
188. Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandamus, supra note 179,
at 2; see also Esposito & Sfondeles, supra note 179.
189. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 101-08 (3d ed. 2011).
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(arty says could cause you to raise or loQer that Rottom line..190 This prevents creative solutions that Qould ;reconcile differing interests in a Qay
more advantageous for both you and them..191 Bottom line negotiations lead
to trench warfare that may prevent the acceptance of a bad deal, but can also
prevent a wise agreement.192
Instead, a BATNA is the alternative ;results that you can obtain without
negotiating . . . . That is the standard against which any proposed agreement
should Re measured..193 By knowing the consequences that will occur in the
event of a failure in negotiations, the parties are better prepared in the event
it does happen.194 Ury and Eisher (oint out that ;the relative negotiating
power of two parties depends primarily upon how attractive to each is the
o(tion of not reaching an agreement..195 In ordinary appropriations settings,
the absence of a default rule for budgets usually
functions as a strong form of penalty-default rule . .
. . However, the absence of a default budget can
function as a distorted penalty-default rule when
only one party is highly averse to negotiation failure, because the default outcome penalizes only that
party. The threat of government shutdowns gives
significant leverage to holdouts.196
Essentially, a government shutdown is not necessarily an adverse event to
the entirety of the legislature like it may be for the public. The default rules
can cure this by not allowing holdouts to have as much leverage in a negotiation that must take place and have a successful outcome.197
The (roRlems that arise are the Rargainers Qho ;TrSealiNe the (otential
of alternatives to agreement..198 Bn the evaluation of all sides’ alternativesK a
party may consider all negotiated possibilities to be inferior to an alternative
course of conduct that does not involve negotiation.199 Therefore, the problem in drafting a budget is that a party becomes reluctant to negotiate if the
default budget rule already accomplishes their objectives without needing to

190. Id. at 100.
191. Id. at 101.
192. Id.
193. FISHER ET AL., supra note 189, at 102.
194. Id. at 104.
195. FISHER ET AL., supra note 189, at 106.
196. Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, at 198-99 (emphasis in original).
197. Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, at 199.
198. David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to
Negotiation, 1 NEGOT. J. 163, 166 (1985).
199. Id. at 169.
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negotiate.200 However, the experiences in Wisconsin and Rhode Island may
serve as a rebuttal against this argument, that despite a continuing appropriation at the contemporaneous level of funding, both states continue to pass
budget bills despite the existence of their default budget rules.201 The fact that
a lack of a budget rule has not prompted the Illinois legislature to act any
faster is a corollary to this argument, though Attorney General Madigan has
argued continuing state employee salaries has impeded legislative progress.202 However, the judicial decisions supporting the injunction identify a
policy in the state203 and the most recent failure in passing a grand compromise of a budget was related to positional bargaining and the precarious nature of the negotiated agreement.204 The division between the parties may be
exacerbated by a default budget rule, but the benefits of a default rule would
still prevent many of the consequences of the failure in negotiations and
thereby the consequences of the budget impasse.
To combat a reluctant opposing party, the better course may be finding
a better way to negotiate. Fisher and Ury point out that when convincing the
other side of the merits of your side in principled negotiation fails, then the
party has one of two options, either sidestep and deflect any attacks on your
position or involve a third party to refocus the parties on the goals of negotiation.205 By sidestepping and deflecting attacks on your position, the party
looks behind motives, invites criticism, and recasts attacks on its position as
attacks on the problem, using silence as a means of pressure.206 In the event
that this method also fails, then a third party is called in to refocus the parties
by drafting an agreement no (erson’s ego is committed toK and the authors
suggest ;a natural third (arty may Re a (artici(ant Qhose interests on this
issue lie more in effecting an agreement than in affecting the particular
terms..207 That negotiation results in a successfully passed budget which will
explicitly benefit the citizens of the state more than either the default rule or
the government shutdown should be the goal of the legislature, but default
rules offer a backup where human frailties result in positional bargaining. As
in Wisconsin, the default rule can even act as an agreement that no one has
200. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 15; see also Jessica Tollestrup, Automatic Continuing Resolutions: Background and Overview of Recent Proposals, CONG. RES. SERV. 9-10
(Aug. 20, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41948.pdf.
201. SULLIVAN, supra note 10.
202. See AG Lisa Madigan Files Motion to Stop Paying State Employees Without
Budget, supra note 157; Motion to Present Additional Authority & to Dissolve Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 156, at 2.
203. See "m. Eed’n of /tate v. /tateK 8G95 B? "(( M5thL 95G833-U; see also Jorgensen
v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2004).
204. Vinicky, supra note 125.
205. FISHER ET AL., supra note 189, at 109-10.
206. FISHER ET AL., supra note 189, at 111-14.
207. FISHER ET AL., supra note 189, at 117-19.
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agreed toK Rut can Re changed according to the (arties’ desires during its imI
plementation, as expenditures already incurred offset the appropriations
eventually passed.208 Finally, the enactment of punitive default rules exemplified in New York and California may offer encouragement to stubborn
holdouts.209
B.

ENGRAINING BUDGET IMBALANCES

Default budget rules can take shape in numerous ways, and as exhibited
by the Wisconsin statute210 and the Rhode Island statute,211 can continue
funding at current levels regardless of the fiscal condition of the state. However, default rules can also take the shape of funding programs at the current
rate, permitting entitlement programs to increase or decrease in cost.212 A
default rule can also fund at the current operating level, which provides the
amount re'uired to maintain the (rogram’s activity level from the (rior year
but also leaves entitlement programs to increase or decrease in cost.213 Alternatively, the budget default rule can provide for restrictive budgeting, which
a((ro(riates only a (ercentage of the (rior fiscal year’s o(erating Rudget to
the neQ fiscal year’s Rudget.214 The scope of all these provisions can affect
the amounts appropriated by the default rule, and in that way may serve to
continue increasing a deficit or imbalance regardless of whether it is in the
best interest of the state, especially if an impasse lasts as long as it has in
Illinois.215
Bllinois’s fiscal health is rather poor according to Thomas Walstrum, a
business economist writing for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.216 According to Walstrum’s analysisK Bllinois Qas a relatively loQ-expenditure,
low-revenue state; but starting in the mid-1990s, Illinois began spending a
greater percentage of its revenues than the average of U.S. states.217 Further,
Walstrum notes that the budget has overspent its revenues since the mid1980s, making the concept of a balanced budget a fiction while the state has

208. LANG & SWAIN, supra note 60, at 6-7; see also, Wisconsin Budget Toolkit, supra
note 58.
209. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12; N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 5 (West, Westlaw through L.2017,
Ch. 1-23).
210. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 20.002(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
211. 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-3-19 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 542 of the
Jan. 2016 Sess.).
212. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 5.
213. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 5.
214. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 5.
215. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 9-10.
216. Walstrum, supra note 7.
217. Walstrum, supra note 7.
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accumulated debt.218 The overspending largely came from the change in pension liabilities as well as employee-retirement, with some spending occurring
at a general debt level.219 With this in mind, Walstrum concludes that the
legislature was able to make such moves in spending by underfunding certain
projects and delaying paying off bills, making the current crisis simply the
conclusion of twenty years of poor fiscal performance.220 This has all happened despite the numerous provisions involving a balanced budget,221 not
least among those is the Illinois Constitution provision that states that appropriations made by the General Assembly cannot exceed the estimated available funds.222
The construction of the default rule becomes a key factor in the determination of whether it will be a successful alternative to a negotiated budget,
and whether it serves to reinforce the holdouts noted above that would rather
allow the continuation of the default rule rather than continue negotiations.223
The default measures that have been enacted this far have funded primary
education at full year funding levels, and several other spending categories
at fifty percent funding from the full Fiscal Year 2015 budget.224 A restrictive
budgeting rule that fully funds primary education and funds higher education
and those other spending categories at fifty percent would maintain the status
quo that has been worked out during this impasse. However, maintaining the
status quo by fully funding all state spending may not be the wisest course,
as the University of Illinois Fiscal Futures Project has projected that continuing spending at fully funded Fiscal Year 2015 levels without changes in tax
incomes or reductions in spending can lead to an annual budget deficit of
more than $20 billion by 2027.225 Instead, it has recommended a combination
of austerity measures and tax increases that are part of a plan that is spread
out over a numRer of years to correct Bllinois’s fiscal health.226 Therefore, a
default budget rule that continues appropriations at a reduced or limited level
may serve the best interests by serving as an impetus to the negotiating holdouts without doing further long-term damage to the state by digging a deeper
hole.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Walstrum, supra note 7.
Walstrum, supra note 7.
Walstrum, supra note 7.
See supra Section IV. A.
ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
See Louk & Gamage, supra note 4, at 241.
Dye & Merriman, supra note 7.
Dye & Merriman, supra note 7, at 5.
Dye & Merriman, supra note 7, at 15.
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SUPPLANTING LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Constitutional law and accounting can be perceived as strange bedfellows, especially in comparison to enumerated rights like life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.227 However, the Illinois Constitution makes explicit that
the power to tax resides solely with the General Assembly, and that it shall
;not Re surrenderedK sus(endedK or contracted aQay..228 An argument may
be made that a default rule takes the power to decide the fiscal future of the
state away from legislature, where it was intended to be, transferring it instead to the individual eOecutive agencies’ internal decisions aRout hoQ to
spend a continuing appropriation.229 The Bllinois /u(reme Court’s inter(reI
tation in Jorgensen v. Blagojevich that reiterated the importance and supremacy of the separation of powers doctrine would tend to aid this perceived
problem in a default rule.230
To rebut the argument, a default rule would need to be interpreted to
continue the allocation of power that the legislature had already awarded to
the agency, defining the outer limit of that power, or alternatively, specifically enumerate what the money would be appropriated for, like employee
salaries.231 Since both judges and legislators are protected by the Illinois Constitution with respect to their salaries, and Illinois legislators have added the
additional protection of statutory provisions, a default budget rule that provides for state employee salaries would ideally be promulgated in an amendment to the Illinois Constitution.

VI.

WHAT A DEFAULT BUDGET RULE MAY LOOK LIKE FOR ILLINOIS

Any default rule Illinois may pass in the future is likely to incorporate
provisions that have arisen during this budget impasse. Specifically, two legislators have introduced bills that reacted to the possibility of Attorney General Madigan succeeding in causing an end to state employee salaries being
paid.232 One bill provides only for a set amount of money to ensure payment
through the end of the year that only goes as far as the court order.233 The
otherK s(onsored Ry Couse Re(uRlican "very !ourneK (rovides for a ;conI
tinuing appropriation for each State agency to meet personnel expenditures
227. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
228. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
229. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 9-10.
230. Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652, 660 (Ill. 2004).
231. See Louk & Gamage, supra note 4; Doug Finke, Lawmakers Draft Plans to Keep
State Workers’ Pay Flowing, ST. J. REG., http://www.sj-r.com/news/20170202/lawmakersdraft-plans-to-keep-state-workers-pay-flowing (last updated Feb. 2, 2017, 10:00 PM).
232. Finke, supra note 231.
233. H.B. 1798, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017).
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for each payroll period during which appropriations for personnel expenditures have not Reen made availaRle to that /tate agency..234 The proposed
provision is similar to that used to provide for legislator salaries in the event
of a budget impasse.235
Incorporating the status quo is important to garner enough support for a
provision to pass the legislature, as the provisions of both proposed House
Bills only go so far as to continue paying what a court as a third party has
already deemed to be non-negotiable.236 Thus, a default budget rule that
would be likely to pass in Illinois is likely to cover the salaries of state employees, but is unlikely to fix appropriations levels for agencies and programs
to continue operations.
A riskier option that may not pass for a default budget rule in Illinois in
the event that the legislature fails to pass a budget involves state employee
salaries and a regressive appropriation that allots certain amounts for funding
at a reduced percentage on the prior fiscal year for certain agency programs.
/uch a rule lacks the sim(licity of Wisconsin’s statuteK 237 but would have the
effect of not necessarily increasing Bllinois’s Racklog of Rills and fiscal instaI
bility.238
It’s unlikely given the Bllinois Constitution’s (rovisionsK239 state law,240
and Supreme Court interpretation241 that any default rule will include a penalty default like >eQ Vork’s242 or California’s243 that withholds legislator
pay. However, alternative penalty defaults could be considered, such as leadership term limits in the General Assembly in the event that a budget is not
passed, or another alternative that encourages legislators to negotiate and
compromise.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Government budget negotiations are uniquely situated, in that their existence is necessary, involve a great amount of power, and, in the event of
failed negotiations, have no backup to keep government operations running.
Default budget rules that continue appropriations or act as a penalty default
rule can offer states a degree of stability even in uncertain negotiations. The
234.
235.
236.
note 231.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

H.B. 2803, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017).
Finke, supra note 231.
"m. Eed’n of /tate v. State, 2015 IL App (5th) 150277-U; see also Finke, supra
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 20.002(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
See Dye & Merriman, supra note 7.
ILL. CONST. art IV, § 11.
2014 Ill. Laws 1591.
See Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2004).
N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 5 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, Ch. 1-23).
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12.

2017]

PERSUADING A STATE TO BUDGE IT

519

key is a rule that looks ahead to meet the goal of ensuring security for state’s
citizens over the strategizing of politicians.

